

Study Guide SPECPOL

Chairs: Zumaro Zumaro & Ajatshatru Bhattacharya

Topics:

- 1) Counter Terrorism, Dealing with Radicalization Of Extremists
- 2) The Impact of Privatization of Warfare and Military



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Letters from Chairs

Chair: Zumaro Zumaro



Welcome to the SPECPOL at AUCMUN 2017! I am Zumaro, a master student at Warsaw University of Technology with the specialty of Nuclear Physics. I am an MUN addicted, and have firstly started my journey in this field about 5 years ago when I was a freshman of the university. Accounted to 2017, I have attended twelve MUN conferences both as delegate and chair. During my journey as delegate, I am awarded as Honorable Mention and Most Outstanding Delegate in 2014, Best Delegate 2015, and recently as Best Delegate at Poznan MUN last January.

Serving as chair, I have directed UII MUN 2014 under UN-Women and International Wroclaw MUN 2016 under WHO. This year, alongside Amsterdam University College MUN, I will attend Scotland MUN as delegate, and another 7 MUN as chair in Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, Kazakhstan, India, and Georgia. Meeting new people and talking about politics and international relations both in formal debate and night party. I can't wait any longer to see your best performance!

Deputy chair: Ajatshatru Bhattacharya

It is my utmost pleasure to welcome you to the Special Political (SPECPOL) Committee in AUCMUN 2017! My name is Ajatshatru Bhattacharya and I am 20 years old. I am originally from India but I have been in Netherlands for three years now for my studies. Currently, I am a second-year student doing International and European Law student at The Hague University. When I started attending MUNs I was not sure if they were for me but after attending KULMUN in Belgium I absolutely fell in love with them. So far I have done 12 MUNs and am not looking to stop anytime soon as it will be 18 by the end of May!



Outside of MUNs I enjoy reading a LOT, gaming on PC or Console, graphic designing, attending music festivals and meeting new people. Recently I picked up scuba diving and I absolutely love it! I am looking forward to making the SPECPOL an amazing experience for you!

History of the Council¹

The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations is the Special Political and Decolonization Committee, otherwise known as SPECPOL. Established in 1993, SPECPOL is the combination of the Decolonization Committee (formerly the Fourth Committee) and the Special Political Committee. This committee's inception took place in 1990 when the United Nations established 1990-2000 as the "International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism." This was particularly important considering at the time of the United Nation's creation, 750 million people lived in what would be considered to be a colonized territory. Over eighty former colonies have become independent since 1945.² Today, in part due to the work of the Fourth Committee, this number has drastically decreased to approximately two million, an amount SPECPOL is still determined to address.³

SPECPOL includes all 193 Member States, uniting to alleviate developing countries' dependencies on former colonizing powers. The committee derives power from its mandate in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, which commits to the preservation of the rights and dignities of people living in non-self-governing territories.⁴ The committee passes resolutions with suggestions on the optimal ways for the United Nations and member states to address the issues of colonized people. According to its mandate, the Fourth Committee can discuss issues such as self-determination, decolonization, and peacekeeping efforts. While SPECPOL was derived from the Disarmament and International Security Committee, it takes on issues that the First Committee does not address, as well as looking at topics with a wider scope.⁵ Unlike other UN committees, SPECPOL shines a spotlight on issues pertaining to occupation, colonization, and subjugation, with the primary goal of making all countries independent and self-sufficient from outside powers.⁶ Also according to its mandate, SPECPOL is not able to take military

¹ International Model United Nations Association

² "Historical Background," United Nations, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/history.htm>.

³ <http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/decolonization/index.shtml>.

⁴ "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter XI: Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories," United Nations,

⁵ "Fourth Committee," United Nations,

⁶ Ibid.

action and many of its resolutions are passed along as suggestions to the Security Council, which ultimately decides whether or not the plan of action will be carried through.

Since its inception, SPECPOL has passed many resolutions addressing the quality and framework of information technology in developing countries, paying special attention to the development of the United Nations' Department of Public Information.⁷ The Committee has also attempted to develop a consensus among member states regarding the issue of the peaceful uses of outer space.⁸ Historically, SPECPOL has focused its attention on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, SPECPOL frequently works in conjunction with groups such as the High Commissioner on Refugees and also specialized groups such as the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.⁹ The Special Political and Decolonization committee holds a very unique role in the United Nations. While other main committees aim to resolve current global issues, SPECPOL concerns itself with healing countries from the lasting impact of their troubling histories. The committee's foremost goal is to ensure that all countries enjoy the benefits of the independence to which they are entitled, and only when all countries are economically, culturally, and socially liberated can the world move forward.

⁷ GA/SPD/206, United Nations,

⁸ 7 A/C.4/58/L.1, United Nations, <http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N03/526/63/PDF/N0352663.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁹ 8 "OHCHR Documents," OHCHR Homepage, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/GA/61documents.htm>.

Topic A : Counter Terrorism, Dealing With Radicalization Of Extremists

INTRODUCTION

The impact of terrorism on human rights remains direct and very real, in particular, its threat to the right to life, liberty and physical integrity of victims. Alongside the additional situation related to individual costs, terrorism can destabilize governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, and threaten social and economic development.¹⁰

The attacks in the United States 2001, the train bombings in Madrid 2004, and the attacks in the United Kingdom 2005 have determined the common understanding of the connection between the term of terrorism and mass casualty attacks by non-state actors. The counter measures are implemented by the States in the wake of such attacks, or invoke the attacks to justify such measures. Through government policies of counter terrorism, terrorists are being identified by the states as individuals that present a direct threat to laws, police, security, and military powers and measures. The definition of terrorism is notoriously difficult to pin-point, combined with the ease with which the label applied by the states. The application of the definition of terrorism is very selective. Exploiting popular fears of terrorism provides states with opportunities to engage in military aggression and implement repressive laws that would normally be seen as unacceptable, particularly when done by liberal democracies.¹¹

Since attacks in the United States on September 2001, counter terrorism has taken central stage on national security agendas. Since then, over the previous decade, the term *counterterrorism* has been closely linked to the aggression which is part of internal crimes.

Counter terrorism laws and measures are frequently used by states against political activists, trade unionists, environmentalists, and liberation movements. Individuals may be convicted of a terrorist offence or detained under counter terrorism laws without ever having engaged in or planned any type of violence.¹²

¹⁰ Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

¹¹ Kramer and Michalowski, 2005

¹² McCulloch and Pickering, 2010

HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

“The promotion and protection of human rights for all and the rule of law is essential to all components of the Strategy, recognizing that effective counter-terrorism measures and the promotion of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing” United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (General Assembly resolution 60/288, annex).

The incident of September 11, 2001, was the worst terrorist attack in modern history which caused approximately 3,000 dead and major rest of people injured. It attracted mass attention and perpetuated the fear of terrorism after the incident. In order to meet the safety and security of every person, the USA spent billions of counterterrorist measures. The year 2011 was marked by the assassination of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. That year was also characterised by the drone attack on Ilyas Kashmiri in Pakistan and the killing of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed in Somalia. Despite these victories, and many others, terrorism still poses a significant security threat that must be addressed. Counterterrorism offers myriad choices because there are numerous ways to protect the people against terrorist incidents. The two primary types of counterterrorism measures are defensive and proactive. Such measures, moreover, also limit losses in the event of a successful attack.¹³

In general, foreign aid has been used more often after 9/11 as a proactive counterterrorism tool. Proactive counterterrorism policy can also address the root causes of terrorism by alleviating grievances. As additional information, a proactive response can be a retaliatory raid on a state sponsor, as the United States did against Libya on April 15, 1986, after Libya’s alleged involvement in the bombing of West Berlin’s La Belle discotheque on April 5, 1986.¹⁴

CURRENT SITUATION

Sub-Saharan Africa is of the most striking features of the way terrorism and counter-terrorism have evolved during the last 5 years. The region has experienced the apparent resilience of terrorist groups to increasingly large-scale national and international responses. The African Union has continued to support counter-terrorism both through the various plans and protocols associated with its Counter-Terrorism Framework and through the deployment of African Union peacekeeping forces, such as the African

¹³ Sandler and Lapan 1988

¹⁴ Enders and Sandler 1993

Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).¹⁵ According to the research by Stupart and Waddington – 2013, wider international community, notably the USA, supported the substantial bilateral and multilateral support for counter-terrorism efforts in Sub – Saharan Africa.

For centuries people in democratic countries have argued about the appropriate balance between individual rights and national security. With the spread of anti-terrorism legislation across the globe, this debate between rights and security is also being exported, often to contexts in which the human rights side of the scale has long been neglected. (Whitaker, 2007, 1029)

The Sub-Saharan African context is an interesting platform on which to examine and return to basic conceptual issues.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS¹⁶

Date	Description of the Event
February 22, 1969	Syria: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine founded
February 21, 1970	Israel: PFLP-GC bombing of Swissair jet kills 47
September 1, 1970	Jordan: Palestinian guerrillas expelled from country; Black September takes its name from this day
May 30, 1972	Israel: Three members of JRA, acting on behalf of PFLP, kill 24 and wound 78 in attack on Ben Gurion International Airport
September 5, 1972	West Germany: Israeli athletes held hostage at Munich Olympics by Black September; 11 killed on 6 September
October 29, 1972	West Germany: Three Black September terrorists hijack Lufthansa plane and demand release of those who committed 1972 Olympics massacre; hijackers are captured but all later
December 28, 1972	Thailand: Black September takes hostages and seizes Israeli Embassy; hostages released in return for safe conduct
March 7, 1973	US: Vehicle bombs defused at El Al terminal at Kennedy Airport, the first Israel Bank and Trust Company, and the Israel Bank and Trust Company, and the Israel Discount Bank in New York City; member of Black

¹⁵ Introduction: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa

¹⁶ Historic Timeline, Counter Terrorism Guide

	September arrested in
October 6, 1973	Middle East: Yom Kippur War begins
November 17, 1973	Greece: Student uprising quashed by military and riot police, multiple dead and wounded; 17 November takes its name from this incident
May 13, 1981	Italy: Mehmet Ali Agca attempts assassination of Pope John Paul II
April 18, 1983	Lebanon: Car bomb explodes in front of US Embassy, killing 63 and wounding over 100, Hizballah responsible
June 23, 1985	Canada: Bomb explodes on Air India flight 182, killing 329; Sikhs Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri held responsible and captured on 28 October 2001
August 2, 1990	Invasion of Kuwait begins
March 12, 1993	India: Bomb attacks leave 250 dead, 700 wounded; Pakistan denies responsibility
February 25, 1994	Israel: Settler Baruch Goldstein kills 39 Arab worshipers, wounds another 125, at Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron
March 20, 1995	Japan: Sarin attack kills 12 and sickens 5,000; Aum Shinrikyo responsible
March 7, 1999	Bangladesh: Two bombs kill 10 and wound 75 at political meeting: Harakat – ul – Jigad backed by Bin Ladin suspected
September 9, 2001	Afghanistan: Opposition leader Ahmad Shah Mahsood killed tby two al-Qaida suicide bombers
October 1. 2005	Indonesia: Resort bombings kills 26 and wound more than 100 in Bali
February 12, 2008	Syria: Imad Mughniyah, believed responsible for 18 April 1983 bombing of US Embassy in Beirut, killed by car bombing in Damascus
December 16, 2014	Pakistan: Attack on schol in Peshawar kills 145, including 132 shoolchildren, and wounds another 130, TTP claims responsibility

MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED

United Nations¹⁷

¹⁷ United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism, <http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/>

The Security Council works to enhance the capacity of Member States to prevent and respond to terrorist acts through its subsidiary bodies, which include the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, as well as the 1540 Committee on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Committees are supported in their work by different entities; whereas the Counter-Terrorism Committee has its Executive Director to carry out its policy decisions and conduct expert assessments of Member States, the 1267 Committee draws on a Monitoring Team.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹⁸

Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity. It is a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion and is a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO's work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors.

Internal Government

Each country has responsibility to ensure that measures against terrorism are being taken within their country. However, a bigger portion of responsibility should be taken by countries that risk receiving returning foreign terrorist fighters. Therefore, the strategies of countering terrorist policies shall be implemented by the individual countries, and such countries should address foreign terrorist fighter threat. To name these countries, Norway with its National Action Plan, the Netherlands with its Comprehensive Program to Combat Jihadism, and Denmark with its Countering Violent Extremism Action Plan. Besides, religious leaders also have certain responsibilities to strengthen the programs to counter violent terrorism, combat radicalization to violence and extremism and decrease the possibility of terrorism recruitments.¹⁹

¹⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm

¹⁹ Berau of Counter-terrorism

QUESTION THE RESOLUTION SHOULD ADDRESS:

- 1. How far should the international community intervene within individual countries to address the implementation of counterterrorist policies?**
- 2. How should the United Nations prioritize assisting member states with policies to counter the radicalization of extremist?**
- 3. How should the importance of allocating funds to combat the terrorist organizations actions be addressed? How shall the mechanism of funding be arranged?**

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- <http://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.824/>
- <http://statecrime.org/state-crime-research/a-critical-introduction-to-counter-terrorism-and-state-crime/>
- http://create.usc.edu/sites/default/files/publications/themanyfacesofcounterterrorism-anintroduction_0.pdf
- <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf>
- <https://www.edx.org/course/terrorism-counterterrorism-introduction-georgetownx-guix-501-04x>
- <http://deflem.blogspot.com/2015/04/introduction-study-of-terrorism-and.html>
- http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm
- <http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/>
- <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm>

Topic B: The Impact of Privatization of Warfare and Military

INTRODUCTION

The end of cold war led to an ever-growing trend of replacing soldiers belonging to a State with highly paid civilians and hired guns not subject to standard military disciplinary procedures worldwide.²⁰ These individuals work for private contractors and firms which legally establish themselves as either Private Military Companies (PMCs) or Private Security Company (PSCs) or a combination of both (PMSCs).

In a push to revolutionize military affairs, governments of various States are turning to PMSCs to carry out various tasks that were once undertaken by the State's military alone. These non-state entities of the 21st century operate in extremely blurred situations where the frontiers are difficult to separate. The new security industry of private companies moves large quantities of weapons and military equipment. It provides services for military operations recruiting former militaries as civilians to carry out passive or defensive security. These tasks can vary from provision of supplies such as food to the State's military to fighting on the front lines alongside the military or even alone. Where the idea of nongovernmental actors participating in war is nothing new, the capabilities of today's firms raises new questions and an array of international dilemmas.

RECENT ACTIONS WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS (UN)

It has been recognized within the UN that PMSCs operate unregulated in a legal vacuum; therefore, they pose a threat to civilians and to international human rights law.²¹ The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) therefore entrusted the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries (the Working Group), principally, with the mandate:

“To monitor and study the effects of the activities of private companies offering military assistance, consultancy and security services on the international market on the enjoyment of human Rights (...) and

²⁰ Ian Traynor, 'Special Investigation: The Privatization of War' (*the Guardian*, 2017) <<https://goo.gl/GCGmBd>> accessed 22 March 2017.

²¹ 'The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC)' (*Global Research*, 2017) <<https://goo.gl/zYHO7D>> accessed 22 March 2017.

to prepare draft international basic principles that encourage respect for human rights on the part of those companies in their activities”²²

The Working Group was established pursuant to the resolution 2005/2 (2005).²³ It essentially succeeded the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries, which had been in existence since 1987. In September 2014, the HRC extended the mandate of the Working Group for a period of three years.²⁴ In paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of resolution 33/4 of 2016,²⁵ the HRC:

“17. Requests the Working Group to continue the work already carried out by previous mandate holders on the strengthening of the international legal framework for the prevention and sanction of the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries, taking into account the proposal for a new legal definition of the term “mercenary” drafted by the Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination in his report submitted to the Commission on Human Rights at its sixtieth session, 3 and also the evolving phenomenon of mercenaries and its related forms;

18. Reiterates its requests to the Office of the High Commissioner to, as a matter of priority, publicize the adverse effects of the activities of mercenaries and private companies offering military assistance, consultancy and other military and security-related services on the international market on the right of peoples to self-determination and, when requested and where necessary, render advisory services to States that are affected by those activities;

19. Requests the Working Group to continue to monitor mercenaries and mercenary-related activities in all their forms and manifestations, and private military and security companies, in different parts of the world, including instances of protection provided by Governments to individuals involved in mercenary activities, and to continue to update the database of individuals convicted of mercenary activities;

20. Also requests the Working Group to continue to study and identify sources and causes, emerging issues, manifestations and trends with regard to mercenaries and mercenary-related activities and their impact on human rights, particularly on the right of peoples to self-determination.”

²² Ibid.

²³ 'Working Group on The Use of Mercenaries' (Ohchr.org, 2017) <<https://goo.gl/MPzP5g>> accessed 22 March 2017.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Human Rights Council Resolution 33/4 (formally A/HRC/33/L.8) on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, 2016.

The Working Group has been studying emerging issues, manifestations and trends regarding private military and security companies.²⁶ The HRC and the General Assembly (GA) are informed on these issues through a report. For clearer understanding of the work done by the Working Group it is recommended to read prior reports such as but not limited to: the report on the Mission to the United States of America Document (A/HRC/15/25/Add.3); the report on the Mission to Afghanistan (Document A/HRC/15/25/Add.2); and the general report of the Working Group containing guidelines on regulating PMSCs.^{27 28}

Through their research, the Working Group has highlighted information which indicate the negative impact of the activities of parties such as private contractors and private soldiers who are employed by PMSCs as civilians but are in general heavily armed.²⁹

CURRENT SITUATION

In the cluster of human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by employees of these companies, which the Working Group has examined one can find: summary executions, acts of torture, cases of arbitrary detention; of trafficking of persons; serious health damages caused by their activities; as well as attempts against the right of self-determination. It also appears that PMSCs, in their search for profit, neglect security and do not provide their employees with their basic rights, and often put their staff in situations of danger and vulnerability.

However, perhaps the biggest issue perhaps is the legal status of these groups especially in accordance to international law, international humanitarian law and human rights. As there are no safeguards guaranteeing application of such laws States which utilize PMSCs and are found in violation of international standards, can effectively evade state responsibility.³⁰ Another issue is the consideration of whether the individuals within such groups can be categorized as civilians. In theory, they should not qualify as civilians because they often carry and use weapons, interrogate prisoners and fulfill other

²⁶ Ibid, The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC), See no.

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²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ HRC Resolution the report on the Mission to the United States of America Document A/HRC/15/25/Add.3; and the report on the Mission to Afghanistan Document A/HRC/15/25/Add.2.

²⁹ Ibid, The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC), See no.

2.

³⁰ International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 50; and Charter of the UN, Article 2 (4) on use of forces and breach of human rights.

essential military functions. Furthermore, it should be noted that those armed to such an extent can easily switch from a passive defense to an active offense which can commit gross human rights violations as seen in the *Abou Ghraib Scandal* and even destabilize governments. However, they cannot be considered soldiers or supporting militias under international principles as they are not part of a State's army or in the chain of command, and often belong to many different nationalities.

PMSC personnel cannot generally be considered as mercenaries for the definition of mercenaries as stipulated in the international conventions dealing with this issue does not generally apply to the personnel of PMSCs which are legally operating in foreign countries under contracts of legally registered companies.³¹

POINTS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ADDRESS

To effectively solve the problems associated with privatization of military and security the delegates should try to incorporate clauses that provide legal definition of PMSCs, address the gross human rights violations committed by PMSC with especial emphasis on arbitrary detention and torture and promote awareness about the impacts of utilizing such private contractors while also including solution for the following issues:

Lack of accountability and transparency: The lack of transparency in the use of private contractors compounds the problem of assessing the impact of their increasing role.³² Failures of basic governmental oversight to ensure contract enforcement only continue to add on to the issue of lack of transparency and accountability. Moreover, departures from conventional government contracting procedures exacerbate these failures and obscure whether inherently governmental functions are in effect privatized.³³ Lastly, the large sums of money involved contribute to risks of corruption and a scale of private lobbying that can distort and even paralyze the legislative process.

Trafficking in persons: In 1999, an American military contractor DynCorp International Inc. (DynCorp) had several of its employees engaging in heinous human trafficking activities.³⁴ DynCorp had been

³¹ Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Section II, Article 47.

³² Martha Minow, *Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy*, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 989 (2005).

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Kelly Patricia O'Meara, *DynCorp Disgrace*, INSIGHT MAC., Feb. 4, 2002, at 12.

contracted to provide police services in Bosnia during the late 1990s.³⁵ Several DynCorp employees allegedly purchased women and girls as sex slaves during the U.S. military deployment in Bosnia.³⁶ The scandal only came to light after two whistleblowers were fired for reporting the sexual trafficking violations to DynCorp.³⁷ The scandal took years to uncover and was not fully revealed until the company was forced to acknowledge its wrongful firing of the whistleblowers in subsequent court proceedings.³⁸

To further deteriorate the situation, no criminal charges were brought against the violators.³⁹

Prosecuting the violators fell into a jurisdictional void.⁴⁰ The United States claimed that it was unable to prosecute the individuals under current law because they were outside the United States and were not military personnel.⁴¹ Whereas, the Bosnian Government refused to prosecute the contractors because the DynCorp employees were associated with the peacekeeping forces and were immune to prosecution.⁴² The sole punishment for the egregious actions was simply termination from DynCorp. Furthermore, once the whistleblower case was settled DynCorp was granted a “multimillion-dollar contract to re-establish police, justice and prison functions in post conflict Iraq” even with prominent disapproval within the society.⁴³ While this story did not garner large media attention, both citizens and legislators recognized that something must be done.⁴⁴

Summary executions: On September 16, 2007 in Baghdad, employees of a US-based firm ‘*Blackwater*’ were involved in a shooting incident in Nisoor Square in which 17 civilians were killed and more than 20 other persons were wounded including women and children.⁴⁵ The unjustifiable use of lethal force by such PSMCs has sparked further concerns within the international community. It should be noted that this incident was not the first of its kind, nor was it the last.⁴⁶

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Cam Simpson, U.S. Stalls on Human Trafficking: Pentagon Has Yet to Ban Contractors from Using Forced Labor, *Cut. TRIB*, Dec. 27, 2005, at 1.

³⁷ Ibid O’Meara, n 16.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Kelly Patricia O’Meara, *Bush Taking Battle to the Sex Trade*, *INSIGHT MAC.*, Nov. 24, 2003, at 24 (internal quotations omitted).

⁴⁴ ‘Human Trafficking and Government Contractor Liability’ (*lissonline.net*, 2017) <<https://goo.gl/iGOZP0>> accessed 22 March 2017.


⁴⁵ Ibid, *The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC)*, See no.

2.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Please keep in mind that these topics are only provided to initiate discussions within the committee. The delegates are encouraged to find and address other issues pertaining to the topic that their government might consider of significant importance.

In conclusion, some light needs to be shed on the activities performed by these PMSCs to end impunity and generate conditions of accountability for human rights' abuses.⁴⁷ Lastly, as José L. Gómez del Prado, Member (and former Chairperson-Rapporteur) United nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries once stated "given the impunity and the international legal emptiness in the theatre of operations of PMSCs, it is essential that UN Members adopt an international instrument in order to control and regulate the action of PMSCs."⁴⁸



⁴⁷ 'The Privatization of Warfare, Violence And Private Military And Security Companies' (*Controlpmsc.org*, 2017) <<https://goo.gl/ywxY2O>> accessed 22 March 2017.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

Additional readings (optional)

The Privatization of Military Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of the Private Military Industry by Kyle M Ballard'.

G. Westermeyer, The Impact of Private Actors on Security Governance, Chapter III: Conceptual Foundation: Security Privatization.

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'A Professional Military and The Privatization Of Warfare' (*Pacific Standard*, 2017) <<https://goo.gl/oBz7Uu>> accessed 22 March 2017.

The Privatization of Warfare, Violence and Private Military & Security Companies: A factual and legal approach to human rights abuses by PMSC in Iraq by Jordi Palou-Loverdos (Dir.) and Leticia Armendáriz.

Lindsey Cameron: Private military companies - their status under international humanitarian law and its impact on their regulation, *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 88, Number 863 September 2006.

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